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Abstract: 
 
The main aim of this study is to explore the illusion effect on the growth market of firm value, 
and to examine the value creation of manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX). 
 
The study used pooled data of the manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX), and estimated the overvaluation using the model developed by Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). The real earnings management, based on 
overproduction and auditing, results on an increase in the valuation. However, the value of 
creating actions of the firms in the form of accrual management and real earnings 
management based on discretionary expense are less likely to significantly contribute to 
shape the overvaluation.  
 
The findings are  helpful for regulators to improve supervision to real earnings management 
based on overproduction and the use of the Big Four auditors to prevent any potential value 
creation that leads to misvaluation in the market, as well as for professionals, investors and 
analysts to evaluate the quality of accounting numbers, select a portfolio of stocks, and make 
lending decisions. 
 
Unlike any previous studies highlighting the consequences of overvaluation and focusing on 
predicting the occurrence of overvaluation as a result of earnings management practices, 
this study mainly focuses on the earnings management as the cause of the overvaluation in 
the form of variables of accrual management and real earnings management based on 
discretionary expenses and overproduction. 
 
Keywords: Overvaluation, accrual management, real earnings management, value creation, 
growth illusion. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial statements are important components of financial information capable of 
leading stakeholder decision to measure management performance, compensation 
plan and company assessment. Futhermore, the financial information reported 
affects investor decisions on capital allocation (Xu et al., 2007). However, earnings 
management practices undertaken by managers are more likely to mislead 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company which in 
turn, influence the outcome of the contract mainly depending on the reported 
accounting figures (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Financial information in the form of 
artificial profit by practising earnings management occurs when managers have 
deliberately used the consideration and assesment to manipulate the actual condition 
to achieve the target profit. 
 
This study empirically examines how value creating actions affect firm market value 
being reflected in the condition of the overvaluation of the manufacturing companies 
listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), by estimating the overvaluation using 
the model developed by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). 
Nonetheless, unlike any previous studies highlighting the consequences of 
overvaluation and focusing on predicting the occurrence of overvaluation as a result 
of earnings management practices, this study mainly focuses on the earnings 
management as the cause of this overvaluation. In addition, there is little empirical 
evidence on the relationship between Big 4 auditors and overvaluation.  
 
Meanwhile, the audit quality of Big 4 auditors is perceived to be able to inhibit the 
occurrence of accrual management practices supported by their advantage in terms 
of experienced auditor, auditing resources, and good reputation (Zang, 2012). The 
article attempts to fulfil this literature gap by examining the influence of accrual 
management, real earnings management, and Big 4 auditor involvement on the 
overvaluation. More specifically, to predict the more explanative relationship 
between earnings management and overvaluation, this research separately examines 
earnings management methods, in the form of variables of accrual management and 
real earnings management based on discretionary expenses and overproduction. 
  
2. Literature Review 
 
Previous studies on earnings management have mainly focused on the three 
methods, namely accrual-based earnings management and its consequences (Allen et 
al., 2013; Barton and Simko, 2002; Choy, 2012; Dechow et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; 
Kasznik, 1999), real earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995; Hribar et al., 2006; 
Kothari et al., 2012; Roychowdhury, 2006), and the mechanism of trade-off between 
accrual management and real earnings management (Badertscher, 2011; Braam et 
al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Grima and 
Caruana 2017; Suryanto and Thalassinos, 2017; Thalassinos et al., 2013). 
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All these methods are apparently utilized by managers to achieve any planned target 
profit, which eventually lead to earnings management game. An explanative 
example is budgeting game, in which the manager is not paid for what he does; 
instead, he is paid for how he meets the target (Jensen, 2005). An empirical study of 
Graham et al. (2005) finds that 80% of Chief Finance Officers (CFO) is likely to 
decrease such discretionary expenses as R&D, advertising, and maintenance; and 
55% of CFOs postpone realizing a new project in favor of meeting the target profit.  
 
Earnings management run by top managers purposively tricking the market to create 
overvalued equity. Managers are likely to always try to extend the duration of the 
overvaluation by undertaking back accrual and real earnings management, as well as 
by substantially manipulating Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
(Badertscher, 2011). However, this act eventually negatively affects the firm market 
value when the market has been able to know the growth illusion practised; the 
market value of the firm will fall down because the overvaluation will eventually 
return (Jensen, 2005; Thalassinos et al., 2012a; 2012b; 2015; Allegret et al., 2016). 
 
In addition, the use of auditing services carried out by auditors of the 
four largest accounting firms, namely Delloite Touche Tohmatsu, Price Water 
Coopers, Ernst & Young and KMPG (hereinafter referred to as the Big Four 
auditors), is able to contribute to the overvaluation, as their reputation and qualified 
specialized resources are capable of convincing the investors of a high quality of 
auditing by creating overvalued firm (Houmes et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2012; 
Houmes et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2012).  
 
The underlying theoretical concept of this study is the agency cost theory developed 
by Jensen (2005), highlighting that managers through earnings management and 
auditor activity are possibly able to considerably contribute to overvaluation. The 
activities of earnings management through accrual management, real earnings 
management based on discretionary expense and overproduction, and the use of the 
Big 4 auditors can provide incorrect information exceeding the expectations of 
market growth performance, and thus, the market is very likely to be affected by the 
impact of the illution growth. Consequently, the extent to which the company 
undertakes the value creation through earnings management and the use of the Big 4 
auditors can improve the overvaluation. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
Overvaluation is often defined as a deviation of a company true market value 
(Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). The manager tends to be involved in the practice of 
earnings management by inflating the firm value in the form of accrual management 
and real earning management to maintain the condition of overvalued equity, to 
increase profits, and to meet profit growth expectations (Dechow et al., 2000). On 
the other hand, overvaluation has consequences on earnings management. Chi and 
Gupta (2009) found that overvaluation impacts more intensively on accrual 
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management actions in the following period. The involvement of companies with 
earnings management is basically to maintain the overvaluation of stock prices. 
Badertscher (2011) showed that in the early stages of the overvaluation, companies 
are more often involved in the accrual management and then, replaced by real 
earning management. Thus, a longer company involvement in overvaluations is 
increasingly likely to engage in non-GAAP earnngs management.  
 
Furthermore, overvaluation has consequences on company restatement or indication 
of low earnings quality. Efendi et al. (2007) found that the restatement signs 
apparently appear from the company overvaluation conditions in the years prior to 
engaging in non-GAAP earnings management. This can explain that incentives are 
usable to encourage managers to take action to maintain the overvalued stock price. 
Other empirical evidence found that when investors learn of the earnings 
restatements of overvalued companies, these investors are likely to evaluate previous 
overvaluation, that subsequently results in a loss of investor confidence in the 
company manager (Marciukaityte and Varma, 2008). Thus, this hypothesis is 
proposed as: 
 
H1: The higher the accrual management, the higher the overvaluation.  
 
Both accrual management and real earning management based on discretionary 
expenses and overproduction are the forms of value creation executed by managers 
to increase profits to meet the market expectation. These practices are done by 
manipulating earnings, in which the managers are able to present an artificial profit. 
Consequently, this may result in a decreased quality of accounting numbers, and 
possibly bring managers to budgeting game, to manipulate the target profit (Jensen, 
2005).  
 
Once the target profit is reached, the market responds to it positively. Market views 
that the company has an improved performance and experienced a positive growth. 
This increases the optimism of the market resulting in an increased equity of the 
overvalued company. However, the market is necessarily not able to know that such 
growth is not the actual performance. In other words, the market receives the wrong 
signal regarding the company's performance. Thus, there is misinformation between 
the market and the manager since the performance improvement is actually only a 
growth illusion as the market misjudges the company value.  
 
There is interplay between earnings management and overvaluation. Chaney and 
Lewis (1995) found that earnings management affects firm value. This action, led by 
the manager, aims to maximize value which ultimately results in the investor’s 
information asymmetry. Doyle et al. (2007) revealed that low quality earnings are 
associated with low accrual quality. Barton and Simko (2002) showed the 
relationship between earnings quality and overvaluations by providing evidence in 
which bad information of company fundamentals is related to overvaluation. 
Therefore, two hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
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H2: The higher the real earning management of discretionary expenses, the higher 
the overvaluation. 
H3: The higher the real earning management of overproduction, the higher the 
overvaluation. 
 
In addition, the use of auditing services carried out by auditors of the Big Four, 
contributes to the valuation error or overvaluation, as their reputations as well as 
qualified and specialized resources are able to convince the investors of a high 
quality audit of firm value (Houmes et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2012). The use of the 
Big Four auditors is the proxy of audit quality (Habib et al., 2014; Houmes et al., 
2013; Rusmin and Astami, 2014). In addition, the Big Four auditors have also been 
analysed to explain the manager behavior to aggressively exploit the accrual 
potential management (Francis et al., 1999).  Actually, a high quality audit should be 
able to make the firm value increase naturally, instead of resulting in an overvalued 
equity.  
 
Although it is argued that the failure of the audit by the Big Four auditors possibly 
occurrs (Francis, 2004), the managers use the market confidence on the Big Four 
auditing reputation and quality in predicting the future earnings and cash flow to 
increase the overvalued equity. Furthermore, Zang (2012) found that the Big Four 
auditors are more likely to restrict the company's effort to manage earnings with 
accrual accounts. Badertscher (2011) also found no significant relationship between 
the Big Four and accrual management.  
 
Wang et al. (2012) indicated a significant positive relationship between the Big Four 
auditors and overvaluation. Houmes et al. (2013) show a positive significant 
interaction between a highly valued equity proxied by the price to earnings ratio and 
audit quality. Moreover, the study found that management incentives related to a 
highly valued equity reduce the tendency of accrual management of high quality 
auditors. However, the degree of the influence of the Big Four audit quality and the 
overvaluation is different in each legal regime (Francis, 2004). More specifically, in 
a country with a legal system providing a greater protection to investors, including 
the ability to sue auditors, the Big Four auditors are likely to treat clients more 
conservatively (Francis and Wang, 2008). These results indicate that the Big Four 
audit quality is highly correlated with a country's legal system. Therefore, the 
research hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4: The use of Big Four auditor service significantly increases the overvaluation. 
 
4. Research Design and Variable Measurement 
 
The study was conducted in 2010-2014 and used the pooled data of the 
manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The pooled 
data were considered to be able to present more informative data characterized by a 
high variability, a low collinearity among variables, and the efficient degrees of 
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freedom (Gujarati, 2004). The calculation of the sample was presented in the 
following Table 1. There were 142 manufacturing firms listed in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) during the observation period. A total of 24 companies were 
discarded because of insufficient data. Finally, a total of 118 firms for a period of 15 
years (2010-2014) resulted in a panel sample of 590 firms. 
 
Table 1.Structure of the Sample 
Panel A: Description  
Firms listed in IDX  494 
Financial firms (81) 
Non-financial firms 413 
      Manufacture firms 142 
      Other  271 
Panel B: Manufacture Firms  
Manufacture firms 142 
Insufficient financial data (24) 
Available sample 118 
Undervaluation firms 0 
Overvaluation firms 118 
Final sample per year 118 
Panel C: Composition the final sample of manufacturing firms  
1 Cement 4 
2 Ceramics, Glass, Porcelain 6 
3 Metal and Allied Product 13 
4 Chemicals 8 
5 Plastics and Packaging 11 
6 Animal Feed 4 
7 Wood Industries 2 
8 Pulp and Paper 6 
9 Machinery and Heavy Equipment 0 
10 Automotive and Components 12 
11 Textile, Garment 14 
12 Footwear 2 
13 Cable 6 
14 Electronics 1 
15 Food and Beverages 12 
16 Tobaco Manufactures 3 
17 Pharmaceuticals 8 
18 Cosmetics and Household 3 
19 Houseware 3 
Total the final sample per year 118 
Final sample in 2010-2014 590 
 
4.1 Data Analysis 
 
The article estimates the overvaluation using the model developed by Rhodes-Kropf 
et al. (2005). The model states that if the market potentially makes mistakes in 
estimating discounted future cash flows; or the market does not have all information 
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being posessed by the managers, then the price to true value (mv) captures part of ln 
(M/B) associated with misvaluation.  
 
Accordingly, the following ordinary least squares regression was used to test the 
model specification: 
 
    (1) 
  
in which  is the overvaluation adopted from the metrics of Rhodes-Kropf et 
al. (2005);  is the real earning management based on discretionary 
expenses;  is the real earning management based on overproduction;  
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the use of the service of the Big Four 
auditors and 0 otherwises;  is the return on asset ratio;  is the natural log 
of total assets;  is the cash flow on total assets ratio. 
 
4.2 Measurement-Overvaluation 
 
Moreover, to measure the variables examined, the study used the following formula 
to measure the misvaluation and the growth manipulation (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 
2005, Chi and Gupta, 2009; Efendi et al., 2007; Fu, Lin et al., 2011; 2013; Siougle, 
2007). In the first stage, Rhodes-Kropf et al., (2005) conducted a decomposition of 
M / B into two components: 
 
                                                         (2) 
 
in which   is the reflection of misvaluation and  is the reflection of growth 
illusion. 
In the second stage, this following logarithmic equation was used to represent the 
logarithmic value: 
 
                                                                                  (3) 
 
in which  is the market value;   is the book value; and  is the fundamental value. 
 
Furthermore, in the third stage, equation 2 above was decomposed into three 
components, in which  is for firm; and  for a year: 
 
              (4) 
     
    Firm-specific- error     Industry-level error     Long-run valuation  
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In order to operationalize equation 3, this study used the formula of Rhodes-Kropf et 
al., (2005) by estimating  and  . Hence, the following 
decomposed equation was then used: 
    
                          (5) 
 
in which  is the log value of market value;  is the log value of book value;  
is the log value of net income;  is a dummy value taking the value  1 for 
negative net income and 0 otherwises; and  is the leverage ratio.  
 
Furthermore, equation 5 was run by a cross-section regression to estimate the 
overvaluation of each firm every year. A high value of overvaluation is described by 
a high level of overvaluation and a low value is represented by low level. 
 
4.3 Accrual Management 
  
To measure the accrual management, this study has adopted Dechow et al.'s (1995) 
metrics of Modified Jones’ Model (1991) assuming that the changes that occurr in 
credit sales in the current period are the object of earnings management. 
 
                                                  (6) 
 
in which  is the total accrual of firms i in t period;  is the total asset in t; 
 is the changes of net sales in t; PPEt is firm’s property, plants, and equipment.  
 
Furthermore, equation 6 was estimated by a cross-sectional regression. The 
estimated residual value of the discretionary accruals is a proxy of accrual-based 
earnings management. 
 
4.4 Real earnings management 
 
The measurement of real earnings management used the metrics developed by 
Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) representing abnormal 
discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs to explain the real earnings 
management (Braam et al., 2013; Zang, 2012). The estimation of abnormal 
discretionary expenses used the following Roychowdhury's (2006) equation: 
 
                                                                    (7)   
 
in which DISXt is discretionary expenses or the number of R & D expenses, 
advertising, and Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (SG & A) in t period. 
The abnormal levels of discretionary expenses were measured by the residual 
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estimation value of the regression. A high residual value indicates an abnormal level 
of high discretionary expenses, while a low value shows low discretionary expenses. 
The following equation was used to explain the abnormal estimation of production 
cost (Roychowdhury, 2006): 
 
                         (8) 
 
in which PRODt is the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) in t and inventory 
changes from t-1 to t; At-1 is the total assets in t-1; St is the net sales in t; ΔSt is the 
change in net sales from t-1 to t. An abnormal level of production cost was described 
as the estimated residual of this equation. The higher the residual the higher the 
amount of the excess of inventory; the higher the reported earnings the bigger the  
reduction of the cost of goods sold (COGS). 
  
4.5 Audit Quality 
 
Like some previous studies, this study made use of Big Four auditors as the proxy of 
audit quality (Habib et al., 2014; Houmes et al., 2013; Rusmin et al., 2014) The 
score was dummy, in which 1 indicated the use of the Big Four and 0 if there was no 
use of it. 
 
4.6 Control Variable 
 
The study involved some control variables to examine the characteristics of the firms 
related to overvaluation. These are based on previous empirical studies showing that 
SIZE is positively related to q-ratio (Ameer, 2012), and Tobin's q as a proxy of firm 
market value (Davydov et al., 2014). Furthermore, ROA and operating cash flow 
(OCF) are positively related to the price to earnings ratio of high-value equity as the 
reflection of overvaluation (Houmes et al., 2013) as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Variable Measurement 
OVER : The market value condition did not reflected the true value and 
indicated with positive value of lnM/V (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005) 
AM : Accrual management (Modified Jones Model, 1991) 
RMDISX : Real earning management based on discretionary expenses 
(Roychowdury, 2006) 
RMPROD : Real earning management based on overproduction (Roychowdury, 
2006) 
B4 AF : Dummy variable to indicate the use of Big Four auditors 
ROA : The ratio of net income to total asset (Control Variable) 
SIZE : The firm size measured by the natural log of total assets (Control 
Variable) 
OCF : Operating cash flows divided by total assets. Growth is annual 
change of net sales (Control Variable) 
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5. Findings and Discussion 
  
The mean and median value of overvaluation variables showed positive value of 
0.984 and 0.945, respectively, indicating that the average value of the sample is in 
overvaluation. The minimum value was 0.848, also confirming the condition of 
overvaluation of the sample. The mean and median values of the accrual 
management were 0.021 and 0.023, respectively, reflecting that firms practice 
accrual management. However, there are some firms that do not practice it, indicated 
by the minimum value of accrual management of -1.222. Furthermore, the average 
rate of real earning management based on discretionary expenses (RMDISX ) was 
quite high, indicated by the mean and median values of  1.700, and 0.047, 
respectively.  
 
However, a contrast finding was presented by the negative values of the mean and 
median of the real earnings management based on overproduction (RMPROD). This 
indicates that the average level of this kind of real earning management is very low. 
However, the maximum value of 1.508 indicates that there are some firms practising 
this form of earning management. Furthermore, an average of 44% firms use the 
service of the Big Four auditors (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Minimum Median Maximum Std. Dev Prob 
OVER 0.948 0.848 0.945 1.200 0.041 0.000 
AM 0.021 -1.222 0.023 0.810 0.135 0.000 
RMDISX 1.700 -0.790 0.047 0.372 0.152 0.000 
RMPROD -1.522 -0.634 -0.049 1.508 0.230 0.000 
B4 0.440 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.496 0.000 
ROA 0.061 -0.755 0.045 0.669 0.120 0.000 
SIZE 14.093 9.266 13.937 19.181 1.591 0.000 
CFO 0.078 1.138 0.064 1.138 0.161 0.000 
 
The mean and median values of ROA were 0.061 and 0.045, respectively, indicating 
that the sample firms have the ratio of net income to total assets of 6.5%. This means 
that the average of firms have positive income or a good level of earnings ability. 
The value of natural logarithm to the mean and median values of SIZE were 14.093 
and 13.937, respectively. Based on the exponential calculation or reversal of the 
natural logarithm to obtain absolute values, this result indicates that the average 
value of the total assets of the listed manufacturing firms is US$ 101,524,000. 
Lastly, the mean and median values of OCF were 0.078 and 0.064, respectively, 
showing that the average values of the ratio of the operating cash flow to the total 
assets are 7.8% and 6.4%. In other words, the amount of cash generated from normal 
business operations is positive and sufficient to finance the firms’ activities.  
 
This empirical evidence provides valuable information that the average of the firms 
conduct the action of value creation through accrual management, real earning 
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management based on discretionary expenses, and overproduction. The practice of 
the action was coincided with the overvaluation condition, indicating that firm 
market value is above the underlying value. In contrast, based on the finding, the 
sample firms had a good-enough operating cash flow, positive ROA, and large 
SIZE.  
 
The multicollinearity test analyzing the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables resulted in a correlation coefficient smaller than 0.8, 
indicating that the model is free from multicollinearity. In addition, a high 
correlation value (-0.782) of RMDISX and RMPROD showed an interdependence 
between both variables when the firms ran the actions of both real earning 
management based on discretionary expenses and based on overproduction that were 
not simultaneously executed (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Correllations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. OVER 1        
2. AM -0.059 1       
3. 
RMDISX 
-
0.295*** 
-0.030 1    
  
4. 
RMPROD 0.364*** -0.041 
-
0.782*** 
1   
  
5. 
B4 AF 0.220*** -0.005 
-
0.103*** 
0.182*** 1  
  
6. 
ROA 0.240*** 
-
0.194*** 
-
0.335*** 
0.561*** 0.273*** 1 
  
7. SIZE 0.190*** -0.071* 0.051 0.016 0.444*** 0.189*** 1  
8. 
CFO 0.237*** 
-
0.561*** 
-
0.252*** 
0.233*** 0.233*** 0.559*** 
0.194*** 1 
Notes: ***ρ < 0.01 (two-tailed), **ρ  <  0.05 (two-tailed), * ρ < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
Primary model: 
 
OVER is overvaluation;. AM is .accrual management; RMDISX is real earning management based on 
discretionary expenses; RMPROD is real earning management based on overproduction; B4 AF dummy 
variable (1 and 0) to explain the use of Big Four auditors; ROA is ratio of net income to total asset; Size 
is firm size measured by the natural log of total assets; CFO is operating cash flows divided by total 
assets. 
AM:  
OVER:  
RMDISX:  
RMPROD:  
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5.1 Regression Result 
 
The result of the multiple regression analysis showed that the variables of 
overvaluation (OVER), accrual management (AM), real earnings management based 
on discretionary expenses (RMDISX), and overproduction (RMPROD), the Big 
Four auditing (B4 affiliation) ratio of net income to total asset (ROA), firm size 
(Size) and operating cash flows (OCF) had a moderate level of determination 
reflected by the value of adjusted-R² of 0.176 and significant F-statistic reflected by 
p-value of <0.00. Accordingly, the independent variables were moderately capable 
of explaining the dependent variable. 
 
Furthermore, the result showed that accrual management (AM) is unlikely to have a 
significant relationship with overvaluation (OVER). Accordingly, hypothesis H1 
stating that a significant role of accrual management activity increases overvaluation 
is rejected. The firms that practice accrual management are less likely to be able to 
increase their firm value market to the point of overvaluation. Similarly, the result 
showed an insignificant relationship between real earnings management based on 
discretionary expenses (RMDISX) and overvaluation (OVER). Thus, hypothesis H2 
revealing a significant effect of real earnings management based on discretionary 
expenses on the overvaluation is also rejected.  
 
In contrast, the result showed that hypothesis H3 stating a significant influence of 
real earnings management based on overproduction on overvaluation is supported, 
indicated by a positive significant relationship between RMPROD and OVER. The 
value creation through overproduction practised by the firms increases the optimism 
and expectations of market in firm value growth. Ultimately, it is more likely to 
increase the overvaluation condition. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Barton and Simko (2002), Chaney and Lewis (1995) and Jensen (2005) presenting 
that a bad fundamental condition of firms characterized by a low earning quality is 
related to the management practice in the earnings management of overvaluation. 
 
The finding further showed that the Big Four auditing is of positive significant 
relationship with overvaluation (OVER). This means that hypothesis H4 stating a 
significant effect of the use of the Big Four auditors on the overvaluation is 
supported. The  finding is consistent with that of Houmes et al., (2013) and Wang et 
al., (2012) revealing a positive significant relationship between the audit quality that 
is reflected by the use of the Big Four auditing and the valuation error (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. AM, RMDISX, RMPROD, and OVER 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected Sign OLS Model 
Constant NA 0.892*** 
(58.359) 
AM + -0.021 
(-0.981) 
    A.S. Wibowo, I. Ghozali   
 
503 
 
RMDISX + -0.018 
(-1.042) 
RMPROD + 0.052*** 
(3.759) 
B4 AF + 0.008 
(2.210)** 
Control Variable   
ROA  0.013 
(0.544) 
SIZE  0.003*** 
(3.313) 
OCF  -0.009 
(-0.444) 
Adj-R²  0.176 
F-Statistic  17.841*** 
Notes: ***ρ < 0.01 (two-tailed), **ρ  <  0.05 (two-tailed), * ρ < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
Primary model: 
 
 
Moreover, of the control variables examined, it is only SIZE which has a significant 
relationship with OVER. This evidence reflected that the market optimism on 
earnings performance is more likely to increase if the firm size increases which in 
turn creates a profoundly high market value of the firm.  
 
6. Conclusions                 
 
The empirical findings of this study reinforce the thesis of overvalued equity of 
Jensen (2005). Specifically, this study reveals that the managers are less likely to 
engange the value creation through real earnings management practices based on 
overproduction. The real earnings management based on discretionary expenses is 
also not capable of being the driving force to increase the market value of the firm to 
the point of overvaluation. Hovewer, the real earnings management based on 
overproduction has a significant influence on overvaluation. Moreover, surprising 
evidence was obtained from the use of the Big Four auditors that are more likely to 
lead to the condition of market overvaluation, caused by overconfidence of market 
to the auditing quality, and manager practice to meet market expectations. Overall, 
these findings give valuable insight that not all the value creation created by 
managers is able to manipule market.  
 
The findings imply that the regulators should improve supervision to real earnings 
management based on overproduction and the use of the Big Four auditors to 
prevent any potential value creation that leads to misvaluation on the market. For 
instance, the regulators need to reinforce any rules to reduce the overvaluation 
practices. For the professionals, investors and analysts, the findings are  helpful to 
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evaluate the quality of accounting numbers, select a portfolio of stocks, and make 
lending decisions. Any future research is expected to examine other contributors of 
overvaluation such as analysts, securities, commercial banks, law firms and others 
that lead to misinformation and mis-valuation which are the originator of 
overvaluation, and to estimate each of earnings management practices to provide a 
more detailed analysis contributing to the value creation. 
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